Furk. net : : Furk. You can use it to stream video or listen to your music from PC, smartphone, HTPC or even a game console (XBOX, PS3). WWII History of the 2nd Chemical Mortar Bn. Co D to the 1. 80th RCT (Div reserve). Replacements were received just prior to the operation. Co C landed on Sep 1. The company was placed in a holding position to await reinforcements which never arrived, so with the threat of being cut off and annihilated they withdrew only after serious casualties had been received. Results of this were 1. Returning to its primary mission of firing the mortar, the company successfully broke up a counterattack with its accurate fire. This company also occupied the line as infantry when mortar ammunition was exhausted. Welcome to WD Militaria where you are invited to browse a choice selection of military antiques. As a collector in this field for over 25 years I. Overview Box art Call of Duty: World at War is the seventh major iteration of the Call of Duty franchise and takes place, like the majority of its predecessors. Watch breaking news videos, viral videos and original video clips on CNN.com. The Texarkana Gazette is the premier source for local news and sports in Texarkana and the surrounding Arklatex areas. Meanwhile the positions along the entire beach were critical and firing was limited to repulsing counterattacks. The battalion was placed in support of the 1. Inf which was to swing to the east through Eboli and Olivetto, to Benevento. The enemy was fighting a determined delaying action taking advantage of every available terrain feature, and the mortars were kept well forward for quick employment against machine gun and infantry emplacements barring the advance. The mortars were ideal in these situations and were used constantly. The Germans held no great love for the mortar and rather hastily withdrew from positions brought under fire. In this drive, Benevento, a fairly important town, fell to the division after a short fight involving air activity on the part of the Americans and tank- supported counterattacks by the Germans. Here, on the night of Oct 1. The river crossing was to be made at night under a full moon which made visibility almost as good as on a sunny day. At 0. 20. 0 hours, a WP smoke screen was fired to support the crossing of the 1. Inf Rgmt. This was our first night smoke screen, and very successful it was. Movement approximating 3. Div area on Oct 2. Cos A and B to the 3. Div. At this time, the companies were firing mainly schedule and harassing fire for both divisions. Weather conditions were very miserable and it was only the beginning of a time in which living conditions reached their lowest ebb. There was absolutely no shelter except for caves and slit trenches - it rained or snowed constantly - and cold reigned over all. During the next three month period, an average of 9. Fully 1. 0% of the command was rendered inoperative by weather conditions and poor food. It hardly seemed necessary that the battalion be there, but infantry commanders insisted that they have mortars available. Supplies of winter clothing went first to the infantry, which is as it should be, but no one in Fifth Army seemed to realize that our men suffered the same rigorous hardships in the miserable weather and without benefit of proper clothing. Many boys felt that they would be better off in the infantry where they could be issued parkas or combat jackets and overshoes. The latter item did not arrive for us until some time in February. ![]() Ammunition was hand carried about one- half mile, transported across a creek by home- made trolley and then carried by hand to the gun position. The force was attached to the 3. Hulse WWII 3rd Division Soldier: Below are some of the pictures of my dad. In the first picture my dad is the soldier in the darker uniform. Div for the operation and Cos A and B fired in conjunction with the attack. After severe casualties, the SSF secured the mountain. Our firing was limited somewhat by the fact that there was a critical shortage of 4. Only the most important missions could be fired. However, before they could be moved, the entire battalion was ordered to stay in support for the attack on San Pietro and Mt Lungo. Cos C and D were attached to the 1. Inf, but forward observers were placed with all the assault battalions. At 1. 20. 0 on 1. Dec, Co A, with the aid of Co B, fired a smoke screen on the east slopes of Mt Lungo to cut down observation on the San Pietro attack, particularly on a tank company moving down the only road to the village. The other two companies fired on pre- designated targets and against the inevitable counterattacks. The attack on San Pietro was unsuccessful but, in a well executed night attack on Mt Lungo, the 1. Inf secured that terrain feature. With Lungo in our hands, the German position in San Pietro was untenable and an attack the next day was successful. Cos C and D remained attached to the 1. Inf in vicinity of San Pietro. On Dec 2. 7, these two companies reverted to attachment to the 3. Div, which relieved the 3. San Pietro. This relief ended with Company A attached to Task Force Allen, a combat command of 1st Armd Div in the vicinity of Mt Lungo for an attack on Mt Portia, and Co B attached to the 1. Inf for attack on Mt La Chiaia. Both attacks were successful. Task Force Allen, after two days of rough going, secured Mt Portia but casualties were so high that the force could not exploit the evident breakthrough to Cassino. The 3. 4th Div moved right along and ultimately captured Mt Trocchio. The German forces held a very strong line, by virtue of a well fortified position along the Rapido River and positions in and on the mountains surrounding Cassino. Opposing them, II Corps had the 3. Div on the right and the 3. Div on the left, flanked on the east by the French Expeditionary Corps, and on the west by the 1. British Corps. An attack all along the line was to be made, with the main effort in II Corps sector. Two mortar companies were initially attached to each division. At the same time the battalion ammunition section worked on a smoke pot detail to smoke the whole Rapido Valley so that undetected movements could be made in the rear areas in preparation for the assault on Cassino. Troops involved were the 1. Inf with Co A attached, and the 1. Inf with Cos B and C attached. On January 2. 0, the attack began. Cos A and C fired mainly smoke screens to cover the crossings while Co B fired HE and WP against fortified positions. The most bloody fighting the battalion had seen ensued during the following three days. The German positions were practically impregnable, mines were everywhere, and enemy artillery had the crossing points covered thoroughly. Time after time the infantry crossed in the face of all this only to find themselves cut off and practically annihilated. Continuous screens were maintained during all the daylight hours, first to cover the crossing and then to screen the withdrawals. History will record this engagement as one of the most costly of the war. Missions generally consisted of screening enemy visibility in the vicinity of the Abbey de Monte Cassino and of Mt Cairo, both of which points overlooked the plains in front of Cassino. In the ensuing close- quarter fighting, the 3. Div crossed the Rapido, advanced to the edge of Cassino and secured some of the heights overlooking the city. The Germans held tenaciously to the commanding ground, forcing the situation into another stalemate. Consequently, mortar firing settled back into a routine of shooting at everything that moved while at the same time firing night harassing missions to forestall German counterattacks. No major attacks developed on the part of the American forces here, but limited attacks were made to secure certain important hills north and east of Cassino. Co B was relieved on Feb 2. For the first time since Sep 1. This represented a total of 1. Looking back on that period, it is felt that that time was the roughest the battalion has ever experienced. Enemy resistance, especially during the Cassino phase, was fanatical, and its artillery support was very effective. The main difficulty was extremely adverse weather conditions. Absolutely no shelter was available and the supply of suitable clothing was very slow. It was not a period of sitting in one place for long periods since the supply of chemical mortar battalions never approached the demand. The weapons companies were constantly on the move to the point at which every attack was made. Mentally and physically, the men suffered every minute of the time, suffered quietly and bravely practically beyond the point of human endurance. Such was our part of the battle of Cassino. The remainder of the battalion moved to the vicinity of Frasso, Italy, for rest, rehabilitation and training. The mission of the division was to defend the general line from a point east of Minturno to the sea. The firing of the company was directed at enemy gun emplacements and patrol activity throughout the period. Night harassing missions were fired extensively in this stabilized situation. The front was fairly quiet and it was a matter of shooting at any and all enemy activity. Extensive preparations were under way for the big attack to reach Rome. For the first time in the campaign, sufficient troops were made available for a major push, and it took some time to regroup the troops. The battalion was attached to the 3. Div for training during this period, with particular stress placed on mountain training in the vicinity of Avellino in southern Italy. Italian pack mule companies were made available and special pack saddles for 4. Each company conducted at least one problem in the mountains in conjunction with regimental problems to determine the feasibility of packing the mortars and getting some estimate of logistics in mountain operations. An initial move was made to the 8. Inf Div sector in the vicinity of Mondragoni on the Italian west coast. On May 9 and 1. 0, the battalion moved into positions close to Minturno and hauled ammunition in preparation for the big attack. Initially two companies each were attached to the 8. Divs, but initial concentrations were fired under battalion control on schedule. The time between H- hour on the eleventh and the ultimate rupture of the line on May 1. With the infantry, it was touch and go during those critical moments, and for the mortars it was constant shooting. Initial preparation fires amounted to 1. Success in the operation depended to a great extent on the work of communication sections during the constant enemy shelling. Wire was maintained to each division headquarters, each infantry regiment, II Corps headquarters, all gun positions, and eight FOs. Changes in missions and attachment were made practically on a moment's notice and fire control was superb.
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